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Operations Security (OPSEC), Decision-  
Making and Operational Effectiveness in  
a Multinational Environment

By:


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The views represented here are those of the author and not  
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## ABSTRACT

Operations security (OPSEC) implementation and decision-making are among the multitude of problems operational commanders must address in a multinational environment. This paper uses a Kosovo case study with interviews to demonstrate specific OPSEC challenges facing operational commanders. Particular attention is given to some important principles of decision-making while considering counter-arguments and limitations. Recommendations to deal with the OPSEC challenges center around the need for centralized management, specialized training and courses of action.

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## I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

The overall objective in any mission for an operational commander is to be operationally effective. Most observers would agree, one of the most important elements for operational effectiveness in military operations is surprise. Arguably the most effective way to achieve and maintain surprise and operational effectiveness is through Operations Security (OPSEC). But sometimes OPSEC in a multinational environment is very difficult to achieve and maintain. Today, military operational commanders make critical decisions every day in an effort to achieve and maintain surprise or avoid being surprised while attempting to remain operationally effective in a multinational environment. Those decisions frequently have life or death consequences with severe international political, economic and military implications. With so much at stake when considering the best course of action, an operational commander's decision-making process becomes critically important.

The thesis offered here is: operational effectiveness in a multinational environment cannot be achieved without the centralized management and judicious application of OPSEC measures. The purpose of this paper is to address some of the problems an operational commander must overcome to achieve and maintain surprise in a multinational environment while deciding the best course of action (COA) to accomplish operational effectiveness. This will be accomplished by presenting some background information on the field of operations security followed by a description of some of the OPSEC problems to overcome in a multinational environment using examples from recent actions in Kosovo. Following the section on problems will be a discussion of some principles of decision-making along with counter-arguments and limitations that can be of assistance to an operational commander as

he decides the best COA in this environment. The paper will conclude with a presentation of some recommendations for solving the problems.

## II. BACKGROUND

Operations security in an operational environment has been practiced as long as there has been warfare. Although it was not called operations security at the time, the renowned military theorist Sun Tsu wrote about the importance of OPSEC approximately 2,400 years ago when he said: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."<sup>1</sup> In another reference to the importance of good OPSEC, Sun Tsu wrote:

The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few.<sup>2</sup>

### A. Definition

As important as the concept of operations security is, it is also one of the most misunderstood concepts of warfare. The title itself "operations security" is misleading and might be changed someday but that futile debate has already been going on for some time. OPSEC is often confused with strictly controlling the distribution and protection of sensitive or classified information like a security discipline. Operations security goes beyond the mission of traditional security disciplines. Joint Publication 1-02 defines OPSEC as:

A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

- a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.

c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.<sup>3</sup>

## B. Doctrine

Joint doctrine clearly states OPSEC is not a security discipline "OPSEC is an operational function, not a security function... Denying all information about a friendly operation or activity is seldom cost-effective or realistic."<sup>4</sup> OPSEC is actually an analytical process designed to manage the perception of one's opponent in an effort to mitigate the risk of harm to your own mission or forces. It is also an analytical process concerned with striving to achieve operational effectiveness through the concept of essential secrecy. Essential secrecy means neither excessive nor inadequate flow of information while striving to achieve operational effectiveness.<sup>5</sup>

As an operational function, joint doctrine calls for OPSEC planning to be included in all three major processes for joint planning: the deliberate and crisis action planning processes of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and also the campaign planning process.<sup>6</sup> Sometimes, essential secrecy must be achieved and maintained by both active and passive measures in these planning processes. In some cases operations security might mean taking passive measures to conceal essential information from your opponent that might indicate or confirm your intentions or capabilities. In other cases, operations security might mean actively providing or allowing your opponent to collect information for his own planning purposes that might cause him to act in such a way that the risk to your own mission or forces is reduced or eliminated. The objective is to affect your




## OPSEC and Decision-Making

opponent's perception of your intentions and capabilities in such a way that he will act in a manner to your advantage or refrain from acting in a manner to your disadvantage. When this is achieved, it becomes a force multiplier for your own actions, significantly increases your own operational effectiveness and reduces your own vulnerabilities to harm.

OPSEC is recognized as a part of both command and control warfare (C2W) and information operations (IO) joint doctrine. The more recent of the two, IO, is also the most comprehensive. To be truly effective, OPSEC must be fully integrated with all the other elements of IO. Joint Pub 3-13 calls for the incorporation of OPSEC into an IO cell to ensure "deconfliction and unity of effort." Figure (1) is an illustration of how a Joint IO cell is designed to work.<sup>7</sup>

Figure (1). Joint Information Operations Cell



Source: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Joint Pub 3-13)

### III. OPSEC PROBLEMS IN A MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Achieving and maintaining operational effectiveness is especially complex for the operational commander involved in a multinational coalition or alliance. The decision-making is complicated by the participation of additional players who have their own obligations and allegiances in addition to their interest in working together as a group. Gail

Stark, President of the OPSEC Professionals Society said when asked about some of the problems associated with implementing OPSEC in a multinational environment, "It means trying to conduct your operations with people from different countries who have different cultural obligations and different definitions of what is right or wrong and appropriate or inappropriate."<sup>8</sup> In addition, sometimes the representatives from coalition or alliance members are transferred and new personnel are assigned who do not have a good understanding of their OPSEC obligations. As a result, there is an inconsistent application of the rules regarding OPSEC. Coalition or alliance partners do not necessarily intend to commit harm but instead might choose to share information in their own best interest. It has been said, when it comes to international relations, there are no friends, only competing international interests.

As the number of people who have access to key information increases, the likelihood also increases that the operational commander's opponent will learn the key facts needed at a given time and location to degrade or destroy operational effectiveness. On the other hand, the free flow of information in a multinational environment is vital for two reasons. 1) Multinational partners must know important facts to plan effectively for sequencing and synchronization of operations; and 2) other commanders must know important facts to ensure effective coordination, unity of effort, and understanding of the mission.<sup>9</sup> The decision-maker must weigh the risks and benefits to his operational effectiveness of sharing too much or too little information with not only his opponent but also his coalition partners.

If there is a lack of common understanding among coalition and alliance members on what is OPSEC, the next question is how much of an understanding is there among American military personnel who serve alongside our coalition and alliance partners? The status of

OPSEC training among joint staff officers today is telling. The U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in Fort Monroe, Virginia is responsible for training staff officers for future joint and multinational operations. The training at JWFC is offered according to the Joint Mission Essential Tasks List (JMETL), prioritized annually by each Commander in Chief (CINC). Major James Ells, USAF, Senior IO Exercise Planner and Trainer at JWFC said recently:

OPSEC training here has to compete with all the other training on the JMETL. If a CINC doesn't include OPSEC as a priority item on the JMETL, (joint staff officer trainees) are not likely to get any OPSEC training. Most CINC's never make OPSEC a priority matter. They sort of assume it gets done and take it for granted.<sup>10</sup>

We can also use examples from the recent action in Kosovo to illustrate the difficulties operational commanders must overcome to achieve and maintain operational effectiveness and operations security in a multinational environment.

#### Kosovo Case Study.

The combat operations recently concluded in Kosovo, Yugoslavia will be used primarily as an example of limited war in a multinational environment. Since the fighting in Kosovo was a NATO action, representatives from all nineteen member-countries had to be involved in the decision-making process. For any action to take place there had to be a consensus of all nineteen countries in NATO. As discussed below, NATO has not really done a very good job of protecting its sensitive information and apparently has difficulty making decisions on OPSEC issues. In any multinational environment similar to what we saw with NATO forces in Kosovo, it becomes extremely difficult to be operationally effective when many of the countries you are dealing with cannot be trusted to protect some of the most vital information about your plans and operations. According to Col. Patrick

Sweeney, USA, former American Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Chief of Contingency Plans during Kosovo operations,

The U.S. maintained all detailed targeting matters in U.S.-only information channels for fear of compromise by other NATO members – either inadvertently or with malice intent. This negated many of the allied staff planning procedures that had been in place for years.<sup>11</sup>

Many other American military personnel serving in NATO believe NATO, as an organization cannot adequately protect its information. According to Admiral Leighton W. Smith (ret.), former Commander in Chief (CINC) U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Commander, AFSOUTH during the war over Kosovo:

OPSEC has a huge impact on operational effectiveness. To start with, OPSEC does not exist in NATO. Sometimes you can't take action if other countries are involved. You can't impose operational security the way we think about it on most of the forces you're operating with simply because...every time a piece of information is transmitted, you've got five or six people from different countries looking at it and listening to it.<sup>12</sup>

Every representative from every country in an alliance has an obligation to their own country first and has different loyalties and allegiances. It must be noted, to help their own country decide courses of action on political and economic as well as military issues affecting their own people, they frequently have an obligation to report back to administrative and/or political authorities information learned in multinational meetings. The impact to an operational commander in this environment is that it limits the options and the forces at your disposal. Adm. Smith added,

It (OPSEC) also has a big impact on operational effectiveness since other forces must stay out of your way and you must take care not to unduly risk other forces (operating in your sector) because you're going to do something they don't know anything about.<sup>13</sup>

Another element of the Kosovo operations affected by OPSEC or the lack thereof, was special operations forces. Admiral Smith was unable to carry out special forces operations against indicted war criminals because the most critical element for its success, surprise through effective OPSEC, could not be guaranteed against the Serbs. As he proceeded through the decision-making process, he could not be assured of the presence of effective OPSEC.<sup>14</sup>

Operational effectiveness in peacekeeping operations was also affected by OPSEC in Kosovo. In a NATO meeting conducted after cessation of armed hostilities in Kosovo, Lieutenant General Michael Jackson of the United Kingdom complained about the impact to his operations after American forces destroyed some facilities in the Kosovo region without his knowledge. At the time, he was responsible for NATO ground forces operating out of Macedonia, and for implementing the United Nations Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping operations after the cessation of hostilities. Col. Sweeney explained,

Once the air war started there was no Combined Joint Target Coordination Board (CJTCB) conducted to deconflict targeting matters. All JTCBs were conducted in U.S.-only planning channels. This extreme OPSEC measure negated the vital role the Land Component Commander, (Sir Michael Jackson, LTG, UK) should play in the process. As such, facilities and LOCs (Lines of Communication) were struck which provided little to no impact upon the enemy, but would later impede General Jackson's KFOR forces as they moved into sector after the air battle. Barracks that his forces planned on occupying were destroyed. Infrastructure necessary to implement the agreement was seriously damaged. Targeting had been done through a single U.S.-only filter out of the necessity of OPSEC.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, if there was difficulty coordinating U.S. forces with their multinational partners in Kosovo, the issue of how OPSEC planning was conducted and coordinated must be considered. As stated above, joint doctrine now calls for OPSEC to be included in the

information operations planning cell. Immediate questions come to mind. Was the IO planning cell implemented during Kosovo? If so, how well did it function, who was in charge of OPSEC and how well was OPSEC integrated into the planning process? Instead of settling conflicts and ensuring a unity of effort, it appears there was little to no coordination between OPSEC and other elements of the IO cell. According to observers, Kosovo was the first time anyone tried to follow the new joint doctrine on information operations. The IO cell was designed to be a coordinating agency but in Kosovo, 1/3 of the positions in the IO cell were not manned. No one seemed to know who was in charge of OPSEC so there was little to no coordination with that function. There was a Navy O-4 in charge of coordinating the IO cell but some of the representatives reporting to the cell were either unfamiliar with the concept or were O-6's whose primary responsibility was conducting crisis action planning in their own area.<sup>16</sup> For all of the reasons above, operational effectiveness in a multinational environment does not appear to be achievable without the centralized management and application of judiciously applied OPSEC measures.

#### IV. OPSEC DECISION-MAKING

Now that the problems of maintaining OPSEC and operational effectiveness in a multinational environment have been clearly indicated, the next question for an operational commander is how to strike a balance with these competing concerns. When an operational commander is faced with completing a mission, one of the most important decisions or series of decisions he will have to make is whether or not to apply OPSEC measures, and if so, which measures are most appropriate. Essentially he is trying to assess the risk and likely

outcome from providing or denying information to the opponent. Assessing the risk is the fourth step in the standard five-step OPSEC process.<sup>17</sup> The purpose here is not to discuss the OPSEC process but to illuminate some of the decision-making options for the operational commander when assessing the risk of action or inaction. The best course of action can range anywhere from nearly complete denial of information to providing partially correct information to providing an array of false information. The decision-making process he uses to determine the best course of action can mean the difference between operational effectiveness and failure.

Although a thorough discussion of the theories of decision-making is beyond the scope of this paper, the following section will review the standard military model of decision-making and two other widely used models. An additional framework for consideration in decision-making will be offered later in the paper.


### A. The OODA Decision Cycle

The standard model for joint military decision-making in C2W is called Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action otherwise known as the OODA Loop or Decision Cycle.<sup>18</sup> The cycle begins when the decision-maker, in this case the operational commander, begins to collect information based on observations primarily made by subordinate commanders and intelligence collection assets. In the next phase of the cycle, the orientation phase, the raw information gathered in the observation phase is analyzed so the decision-maker can assess and update the actual condition of his operational area including the opposing forces. After assessing the actual condition of his operational area, the operational commander decides the best courses of action and communicates those decisions to subordinate commanders. In the final phase, the subordinate commanders act on those decisions.



This model recognizes that all four of these phases are occurring simultaneously not just sequentially and opposing decision-makers are going through the same process at the same time. As both sides proceed through the decision cycle, actions taken by either side will have an impact on the other's decision-making. According to this theory, the commander who gets through the cycle the quickest will have the advantage in an operational environment. Figure (2) below shows the OODA Decision Cycle as depicted in current joint doctrine.<sup>19</sup>

Figure (2). The OODA Decision Cycle




Source: Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (Joint Pub 3-13.1)

To be successful in this decision framework, a decision-maker must have both speed and accuracy as he proceeds through the process. To maximize the negative impact on the opposing decision-makers, an operational commander should use all the elements of C2W or IO at his disposal especially good OPSEC. The objective is to reduce the opponent's speed or accuracy as he goes through his own OODA cycle.

**B. The Rational Model**

The rational model is one of the most commonly used methods for decision-making. It begins with step 0, setting an agenda. The purpose is to determine the problems to be studied in order of importance and urgency. Step one is to define the problem scope and impact in terms of its current status vis a vis the preferred situation. The second step is to identify specific objectives to help frame the purpose for comparing alternative solutions. The third step is to identify all of the reasonable alternatives. The fourth step involves forecasting what the environment would be like if each alternative were implemented. This step could also be called predicting outcomes. The fifth step is to compare the alternatives. After comparing the alternatives, the decision-maker selects the best choice based on the results of the comparison. The seventh step is to implement or execute the decision. The next step is to monitor the results of the implementation followed by the ninth and final step, evaluating the results.<sup>20</sup> Figure 3 shows the 10 steps of the Rational Model.

Figure (3). The Rational Model



Adapted from: Andrew Lang Golub, Decision Analysis


The Rational Model provides a logical and systematic approach to decision-making. The approach advocates going through the steps in sequence but in practice, as understanding increases, decision-makers often retrace one or more of the steps before proceeding further. This might have particular application in an environment where a succession of events might have an impact on previous results in the process.<sup>21</sup>

### C. The Decision Tree

The Decision Tree Model is also very popular as a decision-making process and recent publications have written a great deal about its application in a variety of situations. The decision tree model is essentially decision-making by flow diagram. Each decision is represented by a rectangle in a decision tree diagram followed by lines similar to branches in a tree leading to all of the possible alternatives. Each of these alternatives is an uncertain

event represented by an oval in the diagram and is followed by additional branches that list the percentage of probability for each possible outcome. The last section in a decision tree diagram indicates whether or not each outcome will achieve the desired objective.<sup>22</sup> Figure 4 shows a Decision Tree Model.

Figure (4). The Decision Tree Model



Adapted from: Andrew Lang Golub, Decision Analysis

## V. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AND DECISION-MAKING LIMITATIONS

The counter-argument to the centralized management thesis is OPSEC should be an individual responsibility and should be applied by all those having access to sensitive information. While this counter-argument has some merit, it does not account for the fact it is almost impossible to ensure everyone has adequate OPSEC training because of time constraints and limited training budgets. In addition, the counter-argument does not address the need for coordination with numerous other operational concerns. Uncoordinated and haphazardly applied OPSEC measures can actually impede operational effectiveness.

As possible solutions to the OPSEC decision-making dilemma, all of the above decision-making models have limitations. With a capable opponent, any decision-making process might be vulnerable to attempts to degrade or destroy the operational commander's ability to observe and orient vital information. In today's environment of increasing dependence on data collection from technical or electronic means, an opponent can disrupt the speed and accuracy of an operational commander's decision-making process by attacking those sensors – either by physical destruction or by obscuring the information to be collected. This could slow the operational commander's ability to proceed through his decision-making process and could reduce his ability to execute actions against his opponent in time to be operationally effective. When an operational commander is unable to keep pace with his opponent's own decision-making process, he is forced to be reactive and yields the initiative.<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, attacking the ability to collect or observe accurate information will not by itself eliminate an operational commander's command and control functions or his ability to carry out OPSEC decisions, especially when the attacks are expected. He only needs to use alternative means of observing in order to proceed with the decision cycle.<sup>24</sup>

Both the Rational and Decision Tree models can be quite cumbersome and time-consuming. In a multinational environment, operational commanders might not have the time necessary to conduct an analytical review of all possible alternatives because of the extreme stress and rapid pace of events plus the sheer volume of information involved. All three models are also subject to a lack of political sensitivity, numerous biases, organizational limitations, consequential decisions, uncertainty, time pressure, and an excessive dependence on logic.<sup>25</sup>

## VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The key to solving the problems discussed above is advance preparation and planning. The following are concise recommendations to assist operational commanders maintain operational effectiveness through OPSEC in a multinational environment. It must be noted that these recommendations might not apply in all cases.

The first and most important recommendation is operational commanders should clearly indicate to all subordinates that OPSEC is an operational issue and considering OPSEC in all operational decision-making is imperative for achieving and maintaining operational effectiveness especially in a multinational environment. The incorporation of OPSEC in operational decision-making should be monitored and reinforced to prevent the situation described in the Kosovo case study. The remaining recommendations can be grouped into three categories: decision-making, implementation and training.

### A. Decision-Making

Operational commanders should:

- 1) Make good use of intelligence assessments on each coalition or alliance partner and include assessments of the relationships each partner has with the opponent or a third party who has good relations with the opponent as described under the heading OPSEC Problems in a Multinational Environment.
- 2) Learn to recognize all the forms of bias in intelligence information noted in the Limitations and Model Criticisms section and question the validity and reliability of information.

- 3) Consider using minor tests of faith to tell whether or not your information is safe with each partner. This would have been effective in the Kosovo case study.
- 4) In multinational situations where the US is the primary force provider, instead of trying to determine the impact for each proposed Course of Action (COA), consider requiring coalition partners to clearly indicate in advance, their concerns regarding all potential targets to avoid the problem described with LTG Jackson of the UK.
- 5) Include cultural differences in COA considerations as described by OPSEC Professional Society President Gail Stark.
- 6) Use the Five-step OPSEC analytical process when assessing the risk for each COA as noted in the OPSEC Decision-Making chapter.
- 7) Refrain from exploring all possible alternatives and concentrate on a few options that will at least meet the minimum requirements of the situation.
- 8) Evaluate alternative COAs by combining your own experience with logic then make a decision, act, then reevaluate as events progress.<sup>26</sup>

B. Implementation

Operational commanders should:

- 1) When considering OPSEC COAs, clearly indicate the desired action by opposing as well as friendly forces. This would allow subordinates to focus on the appropriate cover and deception actions.
- 2) Ensure the J-3 considers and approves all OPSEC COAs and works closely with the IO Cell Coordinator. This would address the need for centralized OPSEC coordination.
- 3) Ensure the IO Cell Coordinator is of equal or higher military rank than are those responsible for areas within the IO Cell.

C. Training

Operational commanders should take the following actions to address the training needs noted in the chapter entitled OPSEC Problems in a Multinational Environment.

- 1) Ensure all subordinates and multinational partners are provided at least some basic training on the OPSEC concept of essential secrecy and the five-step OPSEC analytical process.
- 2) Ensure the J-3, IO Cell Coordinator, and the OPSEC representatives complete advanced OPSEC training.
- 3) Ensure all staff officers from all fields within IO or C2W complete intermediate level OPSEC training before being eligible to fill those positions.
- 4) Rehearse/practice OPSEC implementation in all planning and training exercises.
- 5) Request the JWFC to include OPSEC training for all staff officers assigned to a Joint Task Force or a Combined Joint Task Force.

VII. CONCLUSION

After describing some of the challenges an operational commander must overcome to maintain surprise and essential secrecy in a multinational environment, it appears clear the management of decision-making and the coordination and application of judiciously applied OPSEC measures is necessary to maintain operational effectiveness. While OPSEC is also an individual responsibility and should be applied by all those having access to sensitive information, in fact it is almost impossible to ensure everyone has adequate OPSEC training because of time constraints and limited training budgets. Centrally managing all OPSEC-



related measures in a multinational environment through the J-3 is essential for maintaining operational effectiveness.

The challenge of applying OPSEC in the tensions and complications of a multinational environment although quite complex can be managed well by applying sound principles in decision-making. An operational commander can improve the quality of his OPSEC decision-making in a multinational environment by becoming skilled in these principles and combining them with the benefit of his own experience.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Sun Tsu, The Art of War Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 1999), 328.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security (Joint Pub 3-54 CH-1) (Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1994), II.2.b and II.2.c.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of the OPSEC process, see: Ibid., III.2.a.-III.2.e.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., II.2.a.-II.2.d.

<sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Joint Pub 3-13) (Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1998), I-4, IV-3, and IV-4.

<sup>8</sup> Gail Stark, President of the OPSEC Professionals Society, telephone conversation with author, 30 April 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Liles W. Creighton, former Senior OPSEC and Cover & Deception Planner for the Department of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, telephone conversation with author, 2 May 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Major James Ells, USAF, Senior IO Exercise Planner and Trainer, USJFCOM JWFC, telephone conversation with author, 5 May 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Col. Patrick Sweeney, USA, former NATO AFSOUTH Chief of Contingency Plans, interview by author, 24 March 2000, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

<sup>12</sup> Adm. Leighton W. Smith, USN (ret.), former CINC, USNAVEUR and Commander AFSOUTH, interview by author, 29 March 2000, Naval War College, Newport, RI., tape recording.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Sweeney, Op. Cit.

<sup>16</sup> Captain James R. Fitzsimonds, USN, Senior Faculty member and Intelligence Division Head, Naval War College, interview by author, 1 May 2000, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

<sup>17</sup> The five steps of the OPSEC process are 1) Identify the critical information; 2) Analyze the threat; 3) Assess the vulnerabilities; 4) Assess the risk; and 5) Apply appropriate measures.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (Joint Pub 3-13.1) (Washington, D.C.: February 7, 1996), A-1, A-2. This was originally discussed by Boyd, John R., "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," (A collection of unpublished briefings and essays, U.S. Air

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University, Maxwell AFB, AL: 1987), Patterns of Conflict 128, 131-134; Organic Design for Command and Control 23 and 26.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Andrew Lang Golub, Decision Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1997), 9-12.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 31-36.

<sup>23</sup> Arden B. Dahl, "Command Dysfunction: Minding the Cognitive War," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Air University, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 1996), 16-17.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 9-13; Golub, Op. Cit., 12-22.

<sup>26</sup> Golub, Op. Cit., 14-15 and 20-23.

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